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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000530

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SUBJECT: PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE: GOI EXPECTS PRELIMINARY

DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE IRAN PACKAGE

REF: A. STATE 74555

__B. ROSENBERGER-USEU/BRENNER CORRESPONDENCE OF MAY 11-12

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

(C) Summary: On May 11, Post delivered ref A pre-GAERC demarche to Jim Kelly, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU correspondent, and, on May 12, further discussed ref A's Iran points with Stephen Dawson, DFA First Secretary for the Middle East and North Africa. Dawson expected GAERC ministers to offer preliminary thoughts on a possible EU package of incentives/sanctions encouraging Iran to comply with the March 29 UNSC Presidential Statement, as reported May 11-12 in the international press. Kelly anticipated that GAERC discussion on Iraq would be brief and keyed to conclusions welcoming the selection of Prime Minister-designate Nuri al-Maliki. Regarding the DRC, Kelly observed that the Irish Cabinet had recently approved the assignment of 10 military personnel to MONUC to help oversee elections in July. On Liberia, the GOI supported a trial for Charles Taylor under the Special Court for Sierra Leone mandate at The Hague, but could not provide incarceration for Taylor if convicted, as there was no bilateral legal instrument to effect such a transfer. Kelly cited Ireland's support for a UN mission in Darfur, and he asked emboffs to clarify the form of support that NATO could offer AMIS, noting AMIS' misgivings about "NATO boots on the ground." Regarding the Balkans, Kelly related GOI hopes for a legitimate outcome in the Montenegrin referendum, but expressed GOI disappointment with Bosnia's failure to approve constitutional reform and with Serbia's lack of cooperation with ICTY. End summary.

Iran

¶2. (C) The GOI expected GAERC ministers to offer preliminary thoughts on a possible EU package of incentives/sanctions encouraging Iran to comply with the March 29 UNSC Presidential Statement, as reported May 11-12 in the international press, said Dawson. He noted that ministers would likely confer on the broad shape and possible subject areas of the package, as it was too soon to discuss the initiative in detail. Dawson added that the EU-3 would carefully coordinate the evolving elements of any package with the United States, Russia, and China. Separately, Kelly observed that GAERC consultations on Iran would also focus on the April 28 IAEA report and negotiations on a possible UNSC resolution. Ireland's position on Iran, he added, had not changed; the GOI supported the EU-3 approach and preferred a diplomatic solution. Kelly had not seen former Iranian

nuclear negotiator Hassan Rohani's May 9 letter to Time magazine, but he described President Ahmadinejad's May 8 letter to President Bush as another Iranian "feint" that in no way represented serious diplomatic engagement. He said that the GOI had no current plans to approach Tehran bilaterally, but he promised to pass to DFA's senior leadership our request for EU Member States to bring influence to bear on the Iranian Government.

Iraq

13. (C) Kelly anticipated a brief GAERC discussion on Iraq over lunch, keyed to conclusions that would welcome the selection of Nuri al-Maliki as Prime Minister-designate and urge continued progress toward a government of national unity. Discussion would not likely range to possible additional EU assistance to Iraq, though the GOI and other Member States looked forward to more detail on evolving proposals for an international Afghan-style compact with the new government. Reiterating past DFA points, Kelly observed that the security situation in Iraq made it difficult for the GOI to disburse assistance funds already committed, or to add to those commitments.

Democratic Republic of Congo

¶4. (C) On May 9, the Irish Cabinet approved the assignment of 10 military personnel to the expanded United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to help oversee the DRC's July elections, recounted Kelly. As the decision had only been made in recent days, he was unsure when the personnel would arrive in the DRC and what exact function

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they would perform. In terms of greatest potential threats related to the elections, Kelly highlighted, first, security at the polls and, second, the possible violent fallout if the electorate did not accept the results. Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army, Kelly referred emboffs to Pauline Conway, DFA Counsellor for Africa, who noted that Irish Aid (the GOI's USAID-equivalent agency) had a long-standing relationship with the Great Lakes region that included assistance to areas victimized by the LRA.

Liberia

15. (C) Kelly did not expect the GAERC to focus on Liberia, as the Africa point on the meeting agenda would cover the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, Darfur, and elections in Chad. The GOI, he observed, favored a trial for Charles Taylor under the Special Court for Sierra Leone mandate at The Hague. Ireland, however, could not provide incarceration for Taylor if convicted, as there was no bilateral legal instrument to effect such a transfer. On this point, Kelly again referred emboffs to DFA Africa Counsellor Pauline Conway, who believed that Denmark and Austria had already turned down the Dutch on Taylor's possible transfer. She added that Sweden had also apparently said "no," but was still reviewing possibilities under domestic legislation for taking Taylor.

Darfur

16. (C) Ireland was pleased with the Darfur Peace Agreement and hoped that factions remaining outside the agreement could eventually sign on, said Kelly. The GOI, he added, now looked to the international community to step up humanitarian assistance to Darfur and to move toward the establishment of a UN mission for the region. Kelly cautioned, however, that AMIS participants had expressed misgivings about having "NATO boots on the ground." He asked emboffs to clarify the form of support that NATO could offer, e.g., whether strengthened

airlift capacity might be included. (We intend to share with DFA ref B information that NATO could provide 4-500 soldiers, who would work primarily as trainers, observers, and advisors. Twenty percent of this contingent would be American.)

The Balkans

17. (C) Regarding the Balkans, Kelly related the GOI's hope that the Montenegrin referendum would be conducted in a free and fair manner, with a result that could not be questioned. He also expressed GOI disappointment with Bosnia's failure to approve constitutional reform and with Serbia's lack of cooperation with ICTY. Kelly anticipated that GAERC ministers would share views on prospects for Serbia's stalled SAA talks. He did not expect that Balkan regional cooperation would feature in the GAERC discussions, and he added that EU Member States would likely follow the Commission's lead on amending the Stability Pact. Kenny